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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCK MANOR TRUST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
CASE NO. 14382 
vs. : 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH: 
Defendant-Respondent : 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse decision of the 
District Court which upheld the decision of the State 
Road Commission in its finding that a structure belong-
ing to Plaintiff-Appellant could not lawfully be used 
for outdoor advertising purposes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While Defendant-Respondent agrees, for the most 
part, with the statement of facts as set forth in Plain-
tiff-Appellant's brief, there are some facets of the case 
which should be called to the attention of this Honorable 
Court. 
The plaintiff-Appellant in 1959 built a barn on 
its property on the east side of the highway and about 
one mile south of Farmington, Utah, The use of the 
structure as a "barn" was a conforming use under local 
zoning ordinance. However, the owner also desired to 
use the structure for outdoor advertising purposes and 
as to this use it was necessary that Davis County amend 
its ordinance to allow such use* Prior to May 9, 1967, 
(the effective date of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act) 
Davis County did amend its zoning ordinance whereby the 
additional use of the "barn" for outdoor advertising was 
allowed. On the effective date of the Utah Outdoor Advertis-
ing Act on three sides of the "barn" was painted in large 
letters an outdoor advertising message. 
Under the provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertis-
ing Act the sign on the "barn" was given a permit for 1967-
1968, which permit was renewed annually in the years 1969, 
1970 and 1971. In 1971 the Act was amended and effective 
July 1, 1971, a new three year permit was required and 
therefore another 1971 permit was issued for each sign, 
even though a 1971 permit had been issued earlier in the 
year. 
Sometime in September or October of 1972 the "barn" 
caught fire, leaving the structure badly damaged and unfit 
in its burned-out condition for use as a barn or for use as 
outdoor advertising. 
i 
Counsel has argued in the Statement of Facts that 
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entitled to continue its outdoor advertising use subject 
to the control of the Act which included keeping a valid 
permit on the sign, allowing ordinary maintenance, and 
allowing change of advertising copy. 
The new "barn11 was constructed on the site of the 
old structure and was built around and encompassed the old 
structure, thereby increasing the square footage of the floor 
area and the sides of the structure. In May of 1973 the 
owner applied to the State of Utah for a permit to place 
advertising copy on the re-erected "barn" and was refused. 
The owner thereafter placed advertising copy on the "barn"and 
has maintained the painted message thereon since that date 
without a permit from the State. Notice to the sign owner 
and site owner was given by the State pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 27-12-136.9 and the owner requested an 
administrative hearing before the commission at which hear-
ing the commission decided that the use of the "barn" for 
Outdoor Advertising was illegal and the sign was ordered 
painted out or otherwise removed from the structure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS SHOWN BY THE RE-
CORDS, EXHIBITS AND TRANSCRIPT AND SHOULD BE 
SUSTAINED. 
The subject sign, according to the records, was not 
properly "permitted" as of the date of the notice of viola-
lion* The affidav t •-_.'." George K. Fadel would appear to 
indicate that a permit for 1971 was affixed :;> the sub-
ject sign as of the date of the affidavit. However, a 
close examination of the records shows that the permit, 
a copy of which was attached to said affidav»L, is not 
the permit which was presumably attached to the "barn11 ••' 
when it was "substantially destroyed" by Fire. The 
copy attached to the affidavit shows a permit, Number 
2 14142 which is a different permit number from the 
permit Number 20186, issued for the years 1471 through 
] 9 / 3 inclusive-, IDL the s^ qr- --r\ hhe then existing "barn" 
approximately one year prior - -."%-. v- :" the fire and 
which permit was, according t<* lis- testimony of Mr. Smi th, 
the Permit Officer, destroyed Vv he fire (assuming it 
was ever placed thereon). 
The foregoing facts as revealed by the record, 
although sufficient under the law for removal of the 
sign, are not, however, the basis for the decisic;: i 
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This structure was so badly burned by fire some time 
in September or October of 1972 that the owner applied 
to Davis County for a building permit to erect a "barn" 
where the old structure was located. The new building 
was a newly erected structure and was not merely a repair 
of the old one on which was later painted the sign which 
sign is the subject of this controversy. It was the 
placing of the new sign on the newly erected structure 
or "barn" by the owner which created the violation under 
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
Section 27-12-136.4 of this Act provides that all 
controlled outdoor advertising signs capable of being 
read or comprehended from the main traveled way of an 
Interstate or Primary (highway) system shall bear permits. 
Then Section 27-12-136.11 of this Act, provides, that signs 
lawfully in existence on the effective date of the Act 
which become nonconforming by reason of the Act are allow-
ed to remain subject to control and reasonable maintenance 
and that further the state may not terminate such non-con-
forming sign use by preventing or prohibiting reasonable 
maintenance. However, if the subject sign is found in 
violation of Section 27-12-136.8 or 27-12-136.9 the com-
mission is empowered to remove such sign without payment 
of any compensation. 
The position of the state is that since the Act 
defines "maintenance" in Section 27-12-136•3 (10B) as mean-
ing: "to repair, refurbish, repaint or otherwise keep an 
existing sign structure in a state suitable for use"(emphasis 
added) and since Section 27-12-136.3(9) defines the word 
"erect" as meaning: "to construct, build, raise, assemble, 
place, affix, attache, create, paint, draw or in any other 
way bring into being or establish, but does not include any 
of the foregoing activities when performed incident to the 
change of an advertising message or customary maintenance of 
a sign" (emphasis added) the two terms "erect and ordinary 
maintenance" are mutually exclusive and the newly erected 
present structure, having been built after the effective date 
of the Act does not qualify for outdoor adverting use, "ordin 
ary maintenance" rights having been extinguished along with 
the embers of the fire which "substantially destroyed" the 
old barn. 
It is submitted that when the owner applied to local 
authorities for a building permit to erect a "barn," such 
application was an admission that "customary maintenance" of 
the 
/structure was not involved. The application and permit is-
sued was to erect a new structure, designated as a "barn." 
No building permit is ever required to perform and effect 
ordinary maintenance and repairs. 
Counsel refers to a local Davis County zoning 
ordinance which allows within one year the re-erection of 
a non-conforming structure which is destroyed by fire or the 
elements. If the "barn" had been a non-conforming structure 
under local county ordinance, its rebuilding within the year 
as a "barn" would, no doubt, have been allowed as a continuing 
non-conforming use pursuant to the provisions of this local 
ordinance, but, certainly, this fact would not and should not 
allow the local ordinance to control a non-conforming use of 
the structure as a sign under state law where the state law 
.allows only ordinary maintenace and by implication prohibits 
the rebuiliding of a substantially destroyed non-conforming 
sign. 
The trend of the law, as set forth in some of the 
recent decisions of courts of other jurisdictions, and certain-
ly, the more realistic approach, is discussed in the case of 
Service Oil Co. vs. Rhodus, 500 P2d 807 (Colo. 1972) wherein 
the court referring to the case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, stated on p.813: "If a 
property owner has invested money in improvements in order 
to put his property to a particular use, which is lawful at 
that time, and if that use is subsequently outlawed by a zon-
ing ordinance, he loses not only the potential use but also 
the value of his investment. To impose this additional loss 
upon him is unreasonable, and therefore he is entitled 
to continue to use his property as he did before. On 
the other hand, if the improvements are destroyed or 
abandoned, he has lost the value of his investment in-
dependently of the ordinance and there is no reason why 
this relationship to the zoning ordinance should be any 
different from that of his neighbor whose property was 
unimproved." (emphasis added) 
The policy of the lav; as expressed by various 
courts recently is to restrict rather than encourage non-
conforming uses. Sitgreaves v. Board of Adjustment, 
54 A2d, 451? Saddle River ex rel. Perrin v. Babinski, 
259 A2d 727. 
Nonconforming uses are not looked upon with favor; 
they detract from the effectiveness of a comprehensive 
zone plan. Appeal of Roncase (1955, Pa.) 71 Mont. Co. 
LR 362; Parks v. Board of County Commissioners (1972 Or. 
App.) 501 P2d. 85. 
The spirit of zoning is to restrict rather than 
increase non-conforming uses, and to eliminate such uses 
as speedily as possible. State ex rel. Peterson v. Burt, 
(1969) 42 Wis. 2d 284, 166 NW2d 207. 
The case of National Advertising Co. vs. Utah State 
Road Commission, 26 U2d 132, 486 P2d 383, cited by the 
Plaintiff-Appellant is not in point. The Supreme Court 
ruled in that case that since the sign in question was 
erected substantially as discussed and indicated by the 
permit officer the state was, in effect, estopped from 
requiring its removal without compensation. 
That case should be distinguished from the in-
stant case in two particulars: 
First, the subject sign structure or "barn" was 
not re-erected "substantially" as permitted or allowed 
by the permit officer on which an estoppal against the 
removal by the state can be claimed. 
Second, a new structure was built around the site 
of the old one, not as a sign, but as a "barn" and the 
question of its use as a sign, also, did not arise un-
til approximately eight (8) months after the original 
structure bearing an outdoor advertising message was 
substantially destroyed. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the "barn" by Plaintiff-Appellant for 
Outdoor Advertising is unlawful, since the sign thereon 
carries no valid permit from the State of Utah and is a 
newly erected structure located in a non-conforming use 
area in which area Outdoor Advertising is prohibited pur- , 
suant to the provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act. This Honorable Court should, therefore, sustain the 
I 
decision of the Coitunission and the Lov/er Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~ , ^ / / ; / 
" LEON A. HALGREN' / 
.Assistant Attdrney General 
State Capitol 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
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